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Speaking and Listening to Acts of Political Dissent 
 
Matthew Chrisman (Edinburgh) and Graham Hubbs (Idaho) 
1. Introduction: Two Views of Political Speech 
 
When a person voices dissent, she performs a particular sort of speech act. In this paper, we 
analyze a specific sort of dissent: political dissent. These speech acts belong to the class of acts 
that comprise political speech more generally. We will say more about what makes a speech 
act political as we proceed, but as a first pass, consider those communicative acts that are 
performed in a public context for the purpose of influencing how we live together in civic 
society.1 Paradigmatic examples include leading a rally, testifying before an oversight 
committee, voting, petitioning, suing the government, and protesting. These are paradigms of 
political speech, in part, because they are acts that are commonly performed with the self-
conscious goal of influencing how we live together in civic society.2 There are at least two 
distinct ways to understand the role of these speech acts in a basically just democracy,3 which 
we will distinguish by the labels liberal and Rousseauean.4  
 
First, the liberal understanding: because a just society is one that strives to peacefully secure 
and fairly distribute the advantages of mutual cooperation while protecting the rights of each 
individual, a common approach amongst those influenced by, inter alia, Hobbes, Locke, and 
Rawls, is to conceive of citizens as autonomous and equal participants in political compromise 
about how to live together. Citizens, according to this approach, have a strong but defeasible 
obligation to follow the laws of their society, at least when the laws are basically just. Hobbes 
argues that this obligation derives from one’s self-interest; Locke argues that it derives from 
natural law; in an early paper, Rawls rather boldly “…assume[s], as requiring no argument, 
that in a society such as ours, [there is] a moral obligation to obey the law.”5 We are not 
                                                        
1 In his contribution to this volume, Michael Lynch defines political speech as speech aimed at influencing policy. 
We suspect that this is simply a different way of characterizing speech that is aimed at influencing how we live 
together in civic society. By focusing on policy, Lynch draws attention to the general rules and norms that organize 
civil society; we think that any speech that aims to influence collective living will have implications for general 
policies. 
2 A speech act can be political, however, even when it is done primarily for other reasons.  A newspaper, for 
instance, might publish stories primarily because they are of interest to its readership and will sell copies, not 
explicitly because it wants to influence how we live together in civil society. Nevertheless, many editorial 
decisions, it seems to us, count as political speech of a more subtle sort. 
3 By ‘basically just democracy’, we mean, roughly, a society with a relatively stable rule of law and equality 
opportunity for all citizens to vote for legislation and/or representatives in free and fair elections. We don’t mean 
a society that is mostly just, as we take it that even basically just democracies can harbor serious and systemic 
injustices. 
4 This distinction is inspired by Daniel Markovits’s “Democratic Disobedience” (Yale Law Journal 114 (2005), 
1897-1952). Markovits uses the term ‘republican’ to label what we are calling the Rousseauean view. In 
contemporary political philosophy, ‘republican’ may call to mind Philip Pettit’s account of non-domination, which 
is not obviously Markovits’s or our topic. We hope that calling the view “Rousseauean” will prevent any confusion 
with Pettit’s view. Also, we do not claim that these are the only two ways of understanding political speech in a 
basically just democracy, but they are the two that will interest us here. 
5 See, respectively, Hobbes, Leviathan, chs. 13-18, Locke, Second Treatise of Government, chs. 1-13, and Rawls, 
“Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play,” in S. Hook (ed.), Law and Philosophy (NYU Press), pp. 3-18 (the 
concerned here with the source of the obligation; rather, we want only to note that within the 
liberal tradition such an obligation is typically taken to exist.  The obligation can hold even if 
those citizens disagree with a particular law or view it as unjust. Roughly speaking, this is 
because the body of law in force in a society is seen as the result of a basically fair procedure 
for compromising between the competing interests of the citizenry, and such compromises are 
necessary for all (or at least most) citizens to enjoy the vast benefits of social cooperation 
compared to any alternative that lacks the rule of law.   
 
Proponents of this liberal approach would not, however, regard the laws of society as 
indefeasible or beyond reproach. One of the core purposes of political society is continued 
discussion, debate, refinement, and enhancement of the laws, which represent the compromise 
currently in force for living together in society. Given this, political speech might be conceived 
of as the means by which freestanding citizens participate in a continual negotiation about 
which general norms will govern all participants in the collective so that the benefits of 
cooperation get divided fairly, given the private interests of individuals. It’s not only that such 
negotiation aims to improve the compromise in force, moving closer and closer to some ideal. 
The terms of any previous compromise will need to be updated as the material and 
technological situation of the society evolves and the citizenry’s diverse interests change. 
Political speech, according to the liberal, is the principal means by which this improving and 
updating of the social contract transpires. The point of such speech from the liberal perspective 
is for individuals in the group to have a forum to express their beliefs, desires, preferences, and 
goals as a way of getting their voice heard. A right to free speech is a right to voice one’s 
position in collective negotiation.6 
 
The Rousseauean will demur at the liberal’s account of the way individuals are thought to stand 
to the collective in a polity.7 According to this approach, citizens are not “freestanding,” for 
the notion of being an autonomous participant in social negotiations about how to live together 
is dependent on, and not prior to, the notion of a political community. Versions of this thought 
are expressed by Rousseau, Hegel, and Habermas; they seem to be at least part of what Aristotle 
has in mind when he asserts that the polis is prior to the individual.8 These philosophers 
emphasize the ways in which citizens’ interests are inexorably wrapped up with their place in 
society. Because of this, Rousseaueans do not present political speech as the means by which 
freestanding citizens with diverse private interests engage in collective decision making. Good 
collective decision making is not, on this view, a matter of everyone pursuing their own private 
interests within certain constraints. 
 
                                                        
quote is from p. 3). To be sure, Hobbes also thinks there are laws of nature, and self-interest underwrites Locke’s 
conception of natural law, but their emphases are sufficiently different to warrant the characterizations above. 
6 We use ‘right’ here as non-commitally as is possible; we take no stand on the metaphysics of rights. For worries 
about such non-committal usage of the term, see Onora O’Neill, “The Dark Side of Human Rights,” International 
Affairs 81:2, 427-39. 
7 As is common when one draws on an historical figure as the basis for a view, we do not claim here to be 
representing Rousseau’s precise view, nor do we claim that ours is the only plausible interpretation of his view. 
We are, however, partial to the reading of Rousseau that Joshua Cohen offers in Rousseau: A Free Community 
of Equals (New York, Oxford University Press, 2010). When we do draw on the historical Rousseau, we do so 
from Victor Gourevitch’s translation of The Social Contract (in The Social Contract and Other Later Political 
Writings, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1997, 39-152). 
8 Aristotle makes this remark at Politics I.2.1253a19 and I.2.1253a26. For Hegel’s view, see Elements of the 
Philosophy of Right, Allen W. Wood, ed., H. B. Nisbet, trans. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1820/1991); for Habermas’s, see The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. I: Reason and the Rationalization of 
Society, T. McCarthy (trans.). (Boston, Beacon, 1981/1984). 
According to the Rousseauean view, we achieve our autonomy not by being protected from 
and by the majority in our pursuit of our own private interests but by participating in civil 
society. Ideally this gives us what Rousseau calls “civil freedom,” a kind of freedom that is 
impossible outside of civil society.9 This is the freedom, Rousseau claims, of self-mastery, 
freedom from base impulsion, “for impulsion of mere appetite is slavery, and obedience to the 
law one has prescribed to oneself is freedom.”10 This self that prescribes this law is the 
collective self, the polity to which one belongs as a part. In this Rousseauean framework, public 
speech isn’t so much staking out one’s own private (freestanding) negotiating position but 
rather something more like playing one’s role in brainstorming a solution to a collective action 
problem from the perspective of the lawmaking, freedom-constructing collective. 
 
When a people gives itself laws to structure its collective activity, it has given itself, in 
Rousseau’s idiom, a general will. This will coordinates and structures the activity of a 
collective much as a play-call coordinates and structures the activity of a basketball team acting 
as a unified whole. When a person participates in the formation of a general will, she thinks 
about what rule or goal or course of action will benefit the collective, considered as such, rather 
than think about what would benefit her, considered as an individual. If a people gives itself a 
general will, individuals belonging to the collective who act on that will do so in a self-
interested way, but they do so out of collective self-interest, not individual self-interest. Again, 
to act on the general will is to exercise one’s agency, to overcome the shackles of one’s 
individual inclinations to exercise one’s civil freedom.11 
 
In this theoretical context, in contrast with the liberal view, citizens have an obligation to obey 
the law in order to be free, insofar as obeying the law is partly constitutive of having civil 
freedom and exercising autonomy. Still, of course, we shouldn’t think of the laws of any society 
are indefeasible or beyond reproach. Freedom comes in degrees, and—for the Rousseauean—
one of the core purposes of political society remains continued discussion, debate, refinement, 
and enhancement of the laws and so the autonomy of members of the collective. On this 
alternative view, however, the law represents more than the compromise that happens to be 
currently in force for living together in society so that each of us privately shares in the benefits 
of mutual cooperation. Instead, the law represents the collective will of the society, a will which 
can and often is changed. Given this, it becomes more natural to view political speech as the 
principal means by which the collective will is expressed and changed. Rather than seeking a 
negotiated solution in light of competing private interests, this alternative view treats political 
speech as part of continual collective deliberation amongst mutually dependent citizens about 
which norms will govern its collective actions. As Meiklejohn sums up the view of political 
speech according to this perspective: “The point of ultimate interest is not the words of the 
speakers, but the mind of the hearers.”12 On this view, any right citizens have to engage in 
political speech is grounded in the interest of the hearers; it is not, in Meiklejohn’s words, a 
right to “unregulated talkativeness.”13 
 
                                                        
9 Social Contract, I.8.2. 
10 Social Contract, I.8.3. 
11 For more on the idea of the general will and its application to contemporary political issues, see Graham 
Hubbs, “Transparency, Corruption, and Democratic Institutions,” Les ateliers de léthique / The Ethics 
Forum 9:1 (2014): 65-83. 
12 Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and its Relation to Self-Government (New York, Harper Brothers 
Publishers, 1948), p. 28. 
13 Meiklejohn, Free Speech and its Relation to Self-Government, p. 28. 
 
This essay will explore some of the ways these views differ on the norms that govern politically 
justifiable dissent in a basically just democracy. In speaking of an act of dissent being 
“politically justified,” we mean to abstract away from the moral quality of the content of what 
dissenting speakers say. A major reason to want to understand dissent in a political context is 
to figure out what we as a collective should do when we as individuals have deep moral 
disagreements with each other about matters that influence how we live together. Even in 
contexts with deep moral disagreement, we can seek an overlapping consensus that forms a 
conceptual space within which robust moral issues can be bracketed in order to query matters 
of common concern, including the justifiability of acts of dissent. Our notion of political 
justifiability belongs to this space. We will investigate how the liberal and Rousseauean views 
differ on the political justifiability of acts of voicing dissent, and we will also look at their 
explanations of when and why acts of dissent give an audience reason to listen to and take 
seriously what the dissenters are saying. Although we think there is much to learn from the 
liberal and the Rousseauean on these matters, we argue that the conceptual resources on which 
each view relies to explain when we should listen to protest are, in a sense we shall clarify, 
insufficiently morally neutral. Pointing out this common shortcoming will pave the way for 
what we want to contribute to the discussion, viz., a speech-act analysis of dissent. The tools 
of speech-act theory, we hope, will further enrich our understanding of the norms surrounding 
political acts of voicing dissent.  
 
2. Topic: Voicing Dissent 
 
There are various circumstances in which one might find oneself disagreeing with one’s 
government about some issue. When one expresses this disagreement, one voices dissent 
against one’s government. By “voicing dissent” we have in mind the multifarious ways one 
might give voice to this disagreement through political speech. Examples include voting 
against the government, campaigning for the opposition, challenging a sitting politician, 
marching in protest, breaking laws in civil disobedience, and whistleblowing within the 
government. 
 
These examples are not uniform. Some are more extreme than others. Some are more 
constructive than others. Some open one up to legal prosecution more than others.  Within each 
example, we can also imagine a plethora of different instances of its particular form of voicing 
dissent. Voting against the government in a situation where one also disagrees with the main 
opposition has a different character from voting for an opposition in which one truly believes. 
Marching with a few fanatics in support of a niche issue feels different from coordinated 
marching with millions across the country. Some ways of whistleblowing responsibly protect 
government agents whose lives would otherwise be in danger; other whistleblowing exposes 
everything to the Internet. 
 
Any basically fair democracy, we claim, needs to have certain institutionalized channels for 
competing viewpoints to be voiced and discussed regularly. These include regular elections, a 
press that is free to criticize the government, and civic fora that are explicitly constituted for 
the purpose of publicly voicing views intended to influence policy. For any speech act 
performed in one of these institutions, it will be easy enough to say whether the act is justified—
if the rules are followed, the act is justified. To be a bit more precise, we should say that such 
an act would be institutionally justified. The act might have been morally unjustifiable, or 
prudentially unjustifiable, but as long as the rules were followed, the act will be institutionally 
justified for playing by the rules. Maybe these sorts of institutions are all that would be needed 
for voicing dissent in an ideal democracy. However, real world politics illustrates how most 
existing democracies have alternative, less institutionalized channels where competing 
viewpoints are voiced. Civil rights campaigners boycott busses, students occupy administrative 
buildings at their university, famous football players refuse to pledge allegiance to their 
nation’s flag, much-followed tweeters go on rants, etc. At the limit, acts of civil disobedience, 
where one breaks the law in protest of some law or governmental policy, are either a minimally 
or completely non-institutionalized acts of dissent.14 Such acts, nevertheless, may be politically 
justifiable even though they cannot be institutionally justified; sometimes illegal dissent 
deserves to be heard. 
 
Although we think that acts of dissent come in varying degrees, we will focus, for ease of 
presentation, just on acts that are legally performed through institutionalized channels and acts 
of civil disobedience. The next two sections will treat each of these sorts of acts in turn. In each 
section, we will, as indicated in the introduction, explore two normative issues surrounding 
these act-types. The first issue concerns how acts of dissent may be politically justified. As we 
shall see, the liberal view and the Rousseauean view offer competing accounts of what justifies 
acts of dissent. The second issue concerns when and why an act of dissent gives its audience 
reason to listen to and take seriously what the dissenters are saying. Here, the liberal and the 
Rousseauean differ when it comes to listening to institutionalized dissent, but they share a 
general account of when and why civil disobedience should be listened to. We will eventually 
argue that shortcomings of both views should lead us to seek an alternative, but let us learn 
from them first before criticizing them. 
 
3. Legal Dissent 
 
To home in on the normative issues at hand, consider the following pair of cases. Imagine a 
group of students from the Black Lives Matter movement who have assembled to voice dissent 
against the names of certain buildings on campus. The buildings in question are named after 
former slaveholders, and the students have been granted permission by university 
administration to conduct their protest. Compare this case to one in which a group of Alt-Right 
students are granted permission to protest affirmative-action admissions policies. On many 
moral views (e.g., those that include a robust conception of historic justice), one of these groups 
is voicing dissent against something worth protesting, and the other is voicing dissent against 
something worth preserving. Even if only one of these positions is justifiable, it nevertheless 
may be true that both acts of dissent are justifiable. As the examples have been presented, these 
acts of voicing dissent are institutionally justified, because they have been permitted by the 
relevant authorities. Still, even in this institutionally justified context, questions remain: first 
and foremost, should a public institution, such as a public university, permit either or both of 
these dissenting speech acts?  
                                                        
14 It won’t matter for our purposes whether civil disobedience is understood as non-institutionalized, because it 
involves law-breaking, or whether it is understood as minimally institutionalized, because at least some cases are 
recognized as democratically justifiable means of pursuing political objectives. Also, we understand civil 
disobedience as anti-revolutionary, in the following sense: whereas revolution aims at the total replacement of 
existing governmental institutions, civil disobedience seeks to reform certain institutions while preserving most 
of a government’s core institutions. We suspect that the distinction between revolution and civil disobedience is 
a matter of degree, not kind. We don’t think our arguments turn on any specific view of civil disobedience, so 
these rough remarks should suffice for our purposes. 
 
The liberal view of political speech gestured at above would understand the Black Lives Matter 
and Alt-Right protests as an attempts to express positions as part of the ongoing negotiation 
about the norms by which we live together in civic society. Liberals would argue that we should 
respect the speakers’ autonomy (as a liberal will understand it) and so their right to their own 
opinion; moreover, they would argue that we should respect the speakers’ right to voice that 
opinion in a public forum with the intention of influencing policymaking.  In general, the liberal 
views civil rights as protections of the private interests of individuals, especially for cases 
where these interests are challenged by what’s expedient for the collective. So liberals believe 
in a general right to free speech, one which protects the ability to advocate for any view about 
how we should live in society together, no matter how discriminatory or even anti-liberal the 
view might be. They do so precisely because they see political speech as the arena in which 
competing viewpoints about how we should live together can be negotiated so that the resulting 
view counts as a fair compromise. 
 
By contrast, the Rousseauean view of political dissent gestured at above would understand the 
Black Lives Matter and Alt-Right protests as attempts to express and to form the general will. 
According to the Rousseauean, these groups have a right to voice their dissent publicly if—but 
only if—the opinions and arguments they express are not already on the table and might 
plausibly become a part of the general will. If the opinions and arguments are already on the 
table, then for the sake of forming the general will, there is no need to let, e.g., a Black Lives 
Matter or Alt-Right protest repeat the case for its side. Knowing whether a speech act is 
completely repetitive, however, or whether it is contributing something novel to the 
conversation is rarely straightforward. We often are not in a position to know whether every 
relevant argument for a view has been put forward, so there will be a general presumption on 
the Rousseauean view to allow speakers to engage in political speech, even if the topic under 
discussion has been broadly considered.  
 
There are other reasons, however, that on Rousseauean grounds the Alt-Right protesters might 
not have the right to speak. For example, the Rousseauean might exclude old views that history 
has already rejected—e.g., slavery or Nazism. We can think of history as the process of 
collective deliberation and settling on these matters. That doesn’t mean that historically settled 
topics can’t be reopened, but following the principle of stare decisis, there is a general 
presumption against reconsidering views that are already settled. Also, certain views might be 
so beyond the pale as not to merit serious consideration. If the Alt-Right supporter wants to 
advocate that everyone opposed to his view give him all of their money and then willfully jump 
off of a cliff, the Rousseauean can say that he has no right to advocate for this view, as it is one 
that whose potential to become part of the general will is totally implausible.  
 
The liberal thus cleaves tighter than does the Rousseauean to a right to free speech, which 
should be protected from government intervention.15 These differences between the liberal and 
Rousseauean approaches can show up in which rules come to govern specific institutions. For 
example, in the United States, the Supreme Court has made a number of decisions that interpret 
the law in a liberal vein. For example, in Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Court ruled that unless a 
speech act could be shown to lead to “imminent lawless action,” the speaker has a right to 
express their view. The case concerned a Ku Klux Klan rally which dissented to the 
“suppression” of the Caucasian race and called for a march on Washington. The Court ruled 
                                                        
15 The liberal view is thus compatible with the “more speech” doctrine popularized by Justice Brandeis in Whitney 
v. California. For a critique of this doctrine, see Mary Kate McGowan’s contribution to this volume.  
that the rally was permissible as a just exercise of free speech, thereby clarifying the scope of 
the First Amendment. Had the Court reasoned on more Rousseauean lines, it might have 
interpreted the case differently. The Rousseauean might note the historical influence of white 
racism in fracturing the general will, pointing out that white racism for centuries resulted in 
laws for the collective will of white males, not of the polity as a whole. She might go on to 
paraphrase Dr. King, saying that the arc of history bends towards justice, and racist speech no 
longer has any place in forming or maintaining the general will—the matter is settled, and the 
topic is off the table. No listener values from hearing such speech, so, pace the Supreme Court’s 
ruling on the case, no one has the right to express such racist views. An institution embodying 
this line of thought would differ from the institution of free speech as it presently exists in the 
U.S. 
 
The difference between liberal and Rousseauean here also shows up in their respective views 
of when and why an audience has a reason to listen to and consider dissent.16 For the liberal, 
the right to speak entails no corresponding right to be heard. Indeed, just the opposite: a given 
member of the audience has the right to consider or to ignore the speaker’s dissent as that 
member chooses. An audience member has a reason to listen to dissent, according to the liberal, 
just in case doing so either is or appears relevant to the individual interests of that member. By 
contrast, the Rousseauean claims that an audience member has a reason to listen to any dissent 
that is relevant to the project of collective decision making, even if the topic of dissent is not 
relevant to that member’s individual interests. The Rousseauean, again, countenances a right 
to speak only when this is plausibly viewed as an attempted expression of the general will.  
When it is, there is a corresponding right to be heard by the general public. For the 
Rousseauean, the value of speech rests in the minds of the hearer, not the mind of the speaker, 
so if a given speech act is politically valuable, it has a right to be heard. Because the speaker 
of such an act has a right to be heard, the members of the speaker’s community have a reason 
to listen to this act of voicing dissent. 
 
4. Civil Disobedience 
 
Although these views differ on when and why to listen to acts of legal dissent in an 
institutionalized context, they agree, at a general level, on when and why to listen to acts of 
civil disobedience.  To see why, let us start by slightly modifying the cases from the previous 
section. As in the previous section, let one case concern Black Lives Matter students who 
dissent to the names of certain campus buildings, and let the other concern Alt-Right students 
who dissent to affirmative action admissions policies. In both cases, however, let the act of 
dissent not be a permitted rally but rather the illegal occupation of the university president’s 
office. What could justify either of these illegal acts of dissent?  
 
The liberal and Rousseauean agree that such acts can be justified, and that when they are, the 
justification is exculpatory, in that the justification exculpates citizens for violating their default 
obligation to follow the law. Consider the liberal view. Although liberals hold that one has a 
default right to free speech, this default ends with illegality. Nevertheless, liberals generally 
think some civil disobedience is justified as a form of dissent. However, they’re going to say 
that it shouldn’t be promoted, and its protection should only occur as an exception to the law 
(e.g., through pardon or judicial discretion of sentencing) in light of its overall promotion of 
                                                        
16 We aim here to take no substantive view on the nature of reasons. For a review of the various views one might 
take, see Bryan Weaver and Kevin Scharp, Reasons and Semantics (Oxford UP: forthcoming).  
liberal ideals (especially rights). The basic idea is that civil disobedience could be justified 
when going to the extreme of breaking the law is justified by how bad the object of one’s 
dissent is.  More precisely, liberals will say that civil disobedience is justified when it is done 
in the face of a gross violation of civil rights (or something of comparable liberal value), when 
one cannot reasonably expect this to be corrected through more institutionalized political 
processes, and when this dissent will tend to strengthen rather than undermine the overall rule 
of law in the society.17 
 
On the Rousseauean view, by contrast, illegal acts of political dissent are justified if breaking 
the law reasonably appears the only way for some neglected possible component of the general 
will to be considered. More precisely, the Rousseauean claims that civil disobedience is 
justified when there is a “democratic deficit,” i.e., a procedural shortcoming in the formation 
of the general will.18 There are many ways that normal democratic processes can give rise to 
these deficits, including strategic compromises between large factions, the marginalization of 
issues in the name of procedural efficiency, special interest manipulation of normal deliberative 
processes, or the “inertia” of matters that have been decided as law. So, to determine whether 
the act of civil disobedience is justified, Rousseaueans will ask whether the dissenter’s voice, 
or even simply the message that she would have delivered, is being or has been illegitimately 
ignored in “brainstorming” about how to live together in civil society.  This could happen 
through overt silencing, but there are other subtler democratic deficits (e.g., campaign laws that 
prevent some candidates from getting on the ballot, voting systems that corner a perpetual 
minority, corporate control of media). These deficits provide plausible grounds for some 
paradigm examples of civil disobedience (e.g., the anti-global WTO protests). 
 
The views differ, then, on what grounds the justification of illegal acts of voicing dissent. They 
agree, however, on the following: whenever a speaker is justified in illegally voicing dissent, 
the members of the speaker’s community have a reason to listen to what the dissenter is saying. 
On the liberal view, if a rights violation is severe enough to justify civil disobedience, then that 
fact gives members of the relevant community a reason to listen to those who protest about the 
rights violation. Similarly, on the Rousseauean view, if a democratic deficit is gross enough to 
justify civil disobedience, then that fact gives the members of the relevant community a reason 
to listen to the content of that dissent. In spite of their differences regarding the underlying 
justification of civil disobedience, both views treat civil disobedience as exceptional and thus 
in need of a special justification. If that justification can be provided, that fact gives the 
audiences of these illegal acts of voicing dissent a reason to listen to and consider what the 
dissenter is saying. 
 
We think that studying the liberal and Rousseauean approaches to voicing dissent provides 
valuable insights into the normative issues surrounding both institutionalized dissent and civil 
disobedience. These views falter, however, by relying on substantive normative views to 
explain when audiences have a reason to listen to and consider what dissenters are saying. To 
                                                        
17 The locus classicus for this view of civil disobedience is Johan Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1999), pp. 319-343. Other liberal views include Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 104-16, and David Lefkowitz, “On a Moral Right to Civil 
Disobedience,” Ethics 117 (2007), 202-33. Kimberlee Brownlee’s account in Conscience and Conviction: The 
Case for Civil Disobedience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) also belongs to this tradition; see esp. chs. 
1-4. Brownlee advises that we understand justifications for civil disobedience as the sort of thing a defense 
attorney might give; on this, see chapters 5-6 of Conscience and Conviction. 
18 The source of this idea is Markovitz; see his “Democratic Disobedience.” William Smith argues for a 
deliberative democratic view of civil disobedience that has anti-liberal affinities with Markovits’s position; see 
his “Civil Disobedience and the Public Sphere,” The Journal of Political Philosophy 19 (2011), 145-66.  
see how the liberal view falters, consider again the activities of the Black Lives Matter 
protesters who occupy the university president’s office. A sympathizer might argue that we 
should listen to illegally voiced dissent in this case because these protestors are reacting to the 
gross historical injustice of slavery and that, moreover, they would be reasonable to expect that 
this will not be corrected through more institutionalized political processes and that this action 
would tend to strengthen rather than to undermine the overall rule of law. But is that right?  We 
suspect that those on the other side of the debate would say that the names of university 
buildings are no matter of consequence and that the protesters should just get over it and quit 
complaining about slavery. With no agreement about whether there is a serious rights violation, 
there can be no agreement about whether the audience has a reason to listen to the dissenters. 
 
A similar disagreement is predictable between the Alt-Right dissenters and those who disagree 
with them. The Alt-Right dissenters claim that the rights of whites to equal opportunity are 
violated by affirmative action policies; their opponents respond that this is a misunderstanding 
of equal opportunity, and even if there are such rights violations, these are far outweighed by 
the historical injustice of slavery, including its long-term consequences. So, should the 
audience listen to and consider what these dissenters are saying? We think the liberal account 
is going to have a hard time adjudicating on these issues without deploying a theory of rights 
that already has the answer “baked in.” A liberal justification of one or the other examples of 
illegal dissent won’t have any prospect of convincing someone on the other side of the debate 
that the act is politically justifiable and so should be listened to. If the disagreements are 
ultimately about whether there has been a gross violation of rights, appealing to rights in the 
justification if illegal dissent is likely to be question-begging or bump-in-the-rug displacing. 
 
The Rousseauean is no better off than the liberal on this score, for those who disagree about 
whether a policy merits illegal dissent will also tend to disagree about whether there has been 
a democratic deficit. Returning to the examples: a Rousseauean sympathizer might argue that 
these protestors should be listened to because they are giving voice to marginalized points of 
view in our collective brainstorming about how to live together. In either case, the Rousseauean 
justification would go, the act of civil disobedience is worth listening to because it expresses 
something important to the formation and maintenance of the general will.  But a critic in each 
case may simply deny that there is any “democratic deficit” in the sense relevant to justifying 
dissent. Against the Black Lives Matter protesters, an opponent might say that the names of 
buildings are too trivial a matter to the general will to justify breaking the law; against the Alt-
Right protesters, an opponent might say that white people already have a strong, well-heard 
voice, so their claim that their voice hasn’t been heard is unjustifiable. A Rousseauean 
justification of one or the other examples of illegal dissent won’t have any prospect of 
convincing an opponent that the act is politically justifiable and thus one that should be listened 
to and taken seriously by the relevant audience. If the disagreements are ultimately about 
whether there is a democratic deficit, then, in a manner that parallels the problem on the liberal 
view of appealing to rights, appealing to democratic deficits to justify an act of illegal dissent 
is likely to be question-begging or bump-in-the-rug displacing. 
 
The common problem here, we think, is that both views about political speech are committed 
to relaxing the abstraction from content too soon to provide a satisfying analysis of dissent in 
a context of robust moral disagreement. If a theory of political speech is going to make sense 
of when there is reason to listen to dissenters and consider what they are saying in the context 
of such disagreement, then it is going to have to carve out a space where those who disagree 
can still recognize and respect each other’s rights to voice their views and have them taken 
seriously by the relevant audience as part of our collective decision making. The liberal and 
Rousseauean accounts fail to carve out this space, for each attempts to settle justificatory issues 
by appealing to its preferred robust moral view (about rights or democratic deficits). In many 
cases of disagreement, this collapses the space where those who disagree about the relevant 
robust moral issues can still recognize and respect each other’s rights to voice their views. To 
preserve this space, a theory of dissent needs to articulate some normative constraint on 
political speech that does not turn on robust moral views too soon in the chain of justification. 
 
We say “too soon” above because ultimately the ideas that people have rights and that 
collective decisions should be made democratically are moral views, as are the ideas that people 
deserve respect and that peaceful discussion of differences is preferable to violent exercises of 
power. Weak moral assumptions like these are going to be in the background of any 
justification of dissent in the context of political philosophy, and so every view about the 
justifiability of various forms of dissent is going to be ultimately grounded in morality. 
However, by making the question of justifiability of illegal dissent turn on who has which 
rights, a liberal justification will tend to lose many who would agree with these weak moral 
assumptions but still disagree about who has the relevant rights. Similarly, by making the 
question of justifiability of illegal dissent turn on what counts as a democratic deficit, a 
Rousseauean justification will tend to lose many who would agree with these weak moral 
assumptions but still disagree about when there has been a democratic deficit. This is why we 
think the liberal and Rousseauean views about political speech fail to provide theoretical tools 
that are neutral enough to make sense of the political justification of dissent in the face of robust 
moral disagreement. None of this means that the liberal and Rousseauean views don’t 
illuminate particular cases of voicing dissent: we just want some more neutral tools for 
articulating a general normative constraint on political speech that does not turn on robust 
moral views too soon in the chain of justification. 
 
5. The Speech-Act View 
 
We think speech-act theory can supply these tools. To apply speech-act theory to an analysis 
of voicing dissent, note first that all verbal acts of dissent have an evaluative element and that 
most have a corresponding prescriptive element. All verbal acts of dissent evaluate something 
as bad or wrong in some way, and most correspondingly demand change to rectify the badness 
or wrongness in question.19 Focus here on the standard case, in which disapproval is expressed 
and some corresponding change is demanded. For any such speech act, we want to suggest that 
sincerity in disapproval and good faith in making the demand are two of its felicity conditions. 
This means that one engaging in dissenting political speech should sincerely disapprove of that 
of which they dissent, and the way they demand change should reflect a good faith commitment 
to the norms on which these changes are based. (These are not the only felicity conditions we 
acknowledge—more on this below.) That is to say, the norms “be sincere” and “demand in 
good faith” are partly constitutive of political dissent being the sort of speech act that it is. In 
something approaching a slogan, if you’re going to say contrarian things in the context of 
negotiating the social contract, then you should genuinely disapprove of what you’re against 
and be willing to try to live up the alternative norms you are for. 
                                                        
19 Note, then, that some acts of direct action will fall outside of the scope of our analysis. Consider an animal 
rights activist who breaks into a psychology laboratory and liberates the lab mice. This activist is not demanding 
change; he is enacting change directly. His act is not primarily communicative; indeed, if he leaves no trace 
behind, the public may be left to guess at his motive, in which case his act has no obvious assertive element. We 
have no gripe with anyone who wants to characterize direct action as dissent, but we will presently bracket the 
phenomenon. 
 
To repeat, we’re not claiming that a speech act counts as political dissent just in case it is 
sincere and done in good faith. Rather, we’re claiming that these standards provide constitutive 
norms for the speech act of political dissent; if these norms are flouted, the result is, in Austin’s 
terminology, an abuse.20  To get clearer on the way in which these norms can be thought of as 
felicity conditions, let us consider, for the sake of comparison, what it means to say that truth 
is a constitutive norm of assertion that partially determines its felicity conditions. An assertion 
can be bad—that is, infelicitous—if it is difficult to understand as seriously aiming that the 
truth. If, for example, a speaker asserts “I am a pumpkin,” the speech act is bad not only because 
it is false, but also because it is hard to take seriously as even aiming at the truth. Speech acts 
of dissent can go similarly bad, we claim, if they are carried out in ways that indicate either 
insincerity or bad faith. Suppose, for example, that someone in a town hall meeting proposes 
to enforce rules on how long one may speak at the meeting, arguing that a standing but usually 
ignored one-minute-per-speech-rule should be enforced, as meetings are taking too long.  If it 
turns out the dissenter dissents not because she really disapproves of longer slots for each 
speaker but because someone else paid her to say this, we’d think her insincere. Moreover, 
that’d make her dissenting speech act bad qua political speech in an important way: it would 
at least partially undermine audience’s reason for listening to the speaker.21 Similarly, if she 
were to demand that the rules be enforced by giving a ten-minute speech, it would become 
difficult to take her to be seriously engaged in good faith political discussion, as she is actively 
violating the change in policy she purports to be demanding. Unless she is so absent-minded 
that she completely loses track of time, she will seem hypocritical. On our analysis, this makes 
the person’s speech a bad qua act of voicing dissent, not because of the particular policy that 
is being advocated for, nor just because the dissent is unlikely to affect change. It is a bad 
speech act because it is conducted in a way that is self-undermining and so is infelicitous.  
 
So far, this speech-act analysis of dissent may seem fairy anemic. Sure, political dissent 
should—because of the sort of speech act it is—be sincere and in good faith.  But that is 
arguably true of most evaluative and prescriptive speech performed in a cooperative context.  
What does this have to do with the political justifiability of dissent and when audiences have 
political reason to listen to what dissenters are saying? 
 
We think it is already interesting to notice that indications of insincerity and bad faith would 
serve to undermine dissenters’ claim to any right to be listened to by their audience. That 
provides a kind of positive guidance to would-be dissenters: if you want your dissent to be 
heard and taken seriously by your political community, aim to dissent in such a way that avoids 
any suspicion of insincerity or bad faith. However, we also think there is a third constitutive 
norm on the speech act of political dissent that brings us closer to the distinctively political 
realm. We also want to suggest that acts of political dissent should be based (at least implicitly, 
but recognizably) on considerations of justice.  
 
                                                        
20 There is another kind of speech-act norm we won’t discuss here.  The relevant norms do not determine good 
and bad instances of their corresponding acts but enable something to count as a given act in the first place. For 
example, to marry someone in the Catholic church, one must be a priest and the people being married must be 
male and female.  It’s not that a Catholic marriage violating these conditions is somehow bad or not as it ought to 
be qua Catholic marriage; rather, it’s not a Catholic marriage at all. Austin labels these sorts of infelicities 
‘misfires’ (How to Do Things with Words (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1962), 16). 
21 Explaining precisely why this reason would be undermined is a complex matter. For more on this, see Richard 
Moran’s work on testimony, including “Getting Told and Being Believed” (Philosophers Imprint 5/5 (2005)) and 
“Testimony, Illocution and the Second Person” (Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 87 (2013), 115-135). 
We intend “justice” to be understood broadly and generically here: following Aristotle, we do 
not think of justice merely as distributive justice, but also as rectificatory, reciprocal, and 
political.22 If the audience of a speech act of political dissent can’t tell that the speaker is 
addressing, at least in part, what he thinks is and/or isn’t just, then the audience will have a 
hard time interpreting the speaker as engaged in political dissent. Of course, the speaker’s 
reasons may be based in justice even if his audience can’t see that, and of course, a speaker and 
his audience may disagree on whether a purported injustice is, in fact, an injustice. However, 
if it is not clear that justice is at issue at all, a speech act of voicing dissent will likely be seen 
as a sort of personal complaining—it is not likely to be comprehended as the sort of political 
dissent that has been our topic here. Attempts to engage in political dissent that do not 
recognizably engage considerations of justice will, we would expect, be infelicitous. 
 
Having noted this third felicity condition on political speech, let us apply the speech-act view 
to an analysis of political dissent. The view allows for an analysis of the justifiability of dissent 
both in legal institutionalized contexts and for illegal civil disobedience, an analysis that does 
not, as the liberal and Rousseauean accounts do, bring in substantive moral views too soon. 
Those on opposing sides of the political spectrum may disagree whether the name of a building 
constitutes a substantive rights violation or whether there is a democratic deficit in 
marginalizing the voice of whites, but they might still agree that self-undermining speech acts 
of dissent fail to be good political speech. They can agree that whatever the dissenters are 
saying, if they are saying it in a way that comes across as insincere, in bad faith, or completely 
unconcerned about justice, then it will be hard for an audience to recognize as political speech 
worth listening to. We are not claiming here that rights and democratic deficits are irrelevant 
to justifying dissent. Rather, we think that one gets to appeal to those only (a) if both sides of 
a disagreement agree about them, or (b) if more neutral considerations attaching to the speech 
act as such haven’t settled the issue about the justifiability of the dissent.  Many interesting 
real-world cases won’t be like (a), at least not in the moment.  And when we get to (b), we’ve 
basically given up hope on convincing those with whom we disagree—and we shouldn’t do 
that if we’re still engaged in political speech with them (which is consistent with thinking that 
some people are beyond the pale). 
 
We also think our speech-act view provides a more basic and—for that reason—more attractive 
view of when an audience has a reason to listen to and consider an act of dissent. If dissent is 
voiced in a sincere, good faith way and appeals to recognizable considerations of justice, that 
gives the community members to which the dissenters belong a reason to listen to and consider 
what the dissenters are saying. To return to our examples: if the Black Lives Matter students 
are sincere, protest in good faith, and base their complaints in recognizable considerations of 
justice, the university community has a reason to listen to them. The same holds for the Alt-
Right protesters. Now, much will turn on how one fills in the details of “appealing to a 
recognizable conception of justice,” but we think this generic consideration allows us to catch 
the variety of cases in which there is reason to listen to dissent, a variety that is broader, we 
think, than the more specific liberal and Rousseauean views can capture.  
 
Moreover, we think the generality of the speech-act view gives it diagnostic potential that the 
liberal and Rousseauean views lack. Unlike the other views, ours is equipped to explain why 
an act of dissent fails when it does so. Some people fail to listen to Black Lives Matter 
protesters because they are unconvinced that the injustices voiced in their dissent are genuine 
injustices. Others fail to listen to Alt-Right protesters because they hypocritically rely on the 
                                                        
22 Aristotle discusses these sorts of justice in Nichomachean Ethics, V.1-5. 
government programs they decry. We are not claiming that every failure of dissent can be 
explained by the norms we have outlined here, but we do not think that counts against our 
approach—rather, it points to ways to develop it. We hypothesize that when an act of voicing 
dissent fails, it usually does so because some felicity condition, which can be formulated as a 
constitutive norm, has been flouted. For failures that cannot be explained by the norms we have 
presented, we predict there is some further felicity condition and further norm that, when added 
to the speech-act view of voicing dissent, will explain the failure. Proceeding in this way, we 
can enrich our understanding of the speech act of dissent. 
 
6. Conclusion: Reflections on Silencing 
  
Our essay has examined some of the political justifications for voicing dissent and some of the 
reasons one might have for listening to acts of dissent. In the last section, we drew upon the 
resources of speech-act theory to provide an account of the norms surrounding voicing dissent 
that is, we think, more basic than what the liberal or Rousseauean has to offer. We will close 
with some reflections on what our view has to say about acts that silence speech.23 
 
By ‘silencing’, we mean acts that make it very difficult, if not impossible, to hear what a 
speaker intends to say. The limiting cases are those in which a speaker is literally silenced, by, 
e.g., being knocked unconscious or by being gagged, but a speaker may be silenced even 
though she can still speak, perhaps even loudly. If someone who wants to hear the speaker 
cannot do so because of the obstructive actions of others, those others, as we intend the notion, 
have effectively silenced the speaker. Of interest to the present discussion are cases in which a 
speaker is silenced by the speech acts of others; we shall call this phenomenon shouting down. 
What, if anything, does our view have to say about silencing that is accomplished by shouting 
down a speaker? 
 
Based on the arguments of the previous section, if a speaker speaks sincerely and in good faith, 
and if she recognizably appeals to considerations of justice, her audience has a reason to listen 
to her. If her audience has a reason to listen to her, then they have a reason not to silence her, 
and so not to shout her down. This does not mean that the audience cannot be justified in 
dissenting to her, but there is a difference between an audience voicing dissent and a crowd 
silencing with noise. If a crowd uses the amplitude of voice to shout down a speaker, it is not 
voicing dissent. The content of the crowd’s speech is merely incidental; the crowd may just as 
easily achieve its goals by blowing air horns. To defend acts of silencing by appealing to free 
speech, we think, is misguided, or disingenuous, or cynical, but not justifiable. 
 
This is not to say that there cannot be other justifications for silencing speakers. The Antifa 
movement, for example, argues that the pernicious effects of allowing fascist speech 
sufficiently outweigh any considerations—including liberal and Rousseauean—to the contrary. 
There is thus every reason to toe the line, to give “not one inch,” as they say, to the views of 
fascist speakers.24 Our view does not contradict the Antifa position. We claim that the Antifas 
have a reason to listen to fascist speech, if that speech is sincere, made in good faith, and 
recognizably appeals to considerations of justice, but that does not preclude that reason being 
                                                        
23 Our topic here is different from the “elegant silences” discussed in Alessandra Tanesini’s contribution to this 
volume. 
24 For more on the contemporary Antifa movement, see Mark Bray, Antifa: The Anti-Fascist Handbook (New 
York, Melville House, 2017). 
overruled by competing considerations. One might be the pernicious effects of such speech 
(although to make this argument compelling, the Antifa will need to persuade her opponent 
that these effects outweigh the negative effects both of silencing fascist speech and of silencing 
speech in general). Another might be a Rousseauean argument mentioned above, viz., that the 
principle of stare decisis should be applied to fascist views, so, having been historically 
redudiated, they have no place in discussions of the general will. These are competing, 
potentially decisive reasons to silence fascists, but they outweigh the reason to listen to the 
fascist—they do not dissolve that reason. 
 
That is, however, only if the fascist speaks in a way that is sincere and in good faith and that 
recognizably appeals to considerations of justice. If fascism itself simply cannot appeal to any 
such conception, because it is in its nature an unjust ideology, then there is no reason on our 
view to listen to the fascist. If there is no such reason, our view does not oppose silencing 
fascists. The possibility or lack thereof of just fascism is beyond the scope of this essay, even 
if, sadly, it presently merits at least as much attention as the norms surrounding verbal acts of 
dissent.   
 
